From 451d87d386ad44797255d7fb32f62d6d8f1f295e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Silvan Calarco Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 19:29:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] patched against today 'krack' vulnerability [release 2.6-2mamba;Mon Oct 16 2017] --- ...d-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch | 174 ++++++++++++++++++ wpa_supplicant.spec | 7 +- 2 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 wpa_supplicant-2.6-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch diff --git a/wpa_supplicant-2.6-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/wpa_supplicant-2.6-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7276848 --- /dev/null +++ b/wpa_supplicant-2.6-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef +Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake + +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed +frames on RX side. + +This issue was introduced by the commit +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt +failed. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef +--- + src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++- + src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 + + 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +index 4e04169..333035f 100644 +--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c ++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + { + struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap; + struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap; ++ int set = 1; + + /* + * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and +@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but + * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that + * does not support full AP client state. ++ * ++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the ++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for ++ * the same key. + */ +- if (!sta->added_unassoc) ++ if (!sta->added_unassoc && ++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || ++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); ++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED); ++ set = 0; ++ } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N + if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT) +@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL, + sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo, + sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0, +- sta->added_unassoc)) { ++ set)) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, + HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE, + "Could not %s STA to kernel driver", +- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add"); ++ set ? "set" : "add"); + + if (sta->added_unassoc) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 3587086..707971d 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event) + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + break; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; ++ return 0; + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R +@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + } + + ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) ++ return 0; ++ return sm->tk_already_set; ++} ++ ++ + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) + { +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, + u8 *data, size_t data_len); + enum wpa_event { + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED + }; + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event); +@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + return; + } + ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) { ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX ++ * PN in the driver */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only + * after association has been completed. This function will be called +@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; + } + + +@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + + sm->pairwise = pairwise; + sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); + + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { + struct wpa_ptk PTK; + Boolean PTK_valid; + Boolean pairwise_set; ++ Boolean tk_already_set; + int keycount; + Boolean Pair; + struct wpa_key_replay_counter { +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/wpa_supplicant.spec b/wpa_supplicant.spec index a368a5b..d21e54d 100644 --- a/wpa_supplicant.spec +++ b/wpa_supplicant.spec @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ Name: wpa_supplicant Version: 2.6 -Release: 1mamba +Release: 2mamba Summary: WPA/WPA2/IEEE 802.1x Supplicant Group: Network/Security Vendor: openmamba @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ Patch4: %{name}-0.7.3-enable_NL80211.patch Patch5: %{name}-1.0-gcc-4.7.patch Patch6: wpa_supplicant-1.0-wpagui-getopt.patch.patch Patch7: wpa_supplicant-1.0-gcc-4.7.patch +Patch8: wpa_supplicant-2.6-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch License: GPL ## AUTOBUILDREQ-BEGIN BuildRequires: glibc-devel @@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ This package contains the QT4 GUI. #%patch5 -p1 #%patch6 -p1 %patch7 -p1 +%patch8 -p1 %build cd wpa_supplicant @@ -132,6 +134,9 @@ fi %endif %changelog +* Mon Oct 16 2017 Silvan Calarco 2.6-2mamba +- patched against today 'krack' vulnerability + * Sun Oct 09 2016 Automatic Build System 2.6-1mamba - automatic version update by autodist